How do Asustor DeadBolt Ransomware works?

How do Asustor DeadBolt Ransomware works?


If you have EZ-connect turned on in your control panel, it seems to have crept in that way – also shows the danger of having your NAS accessible over public internet either directly or via reverse proxy, apparently …

apparently, this causes /usr/webman/portal/index.cgi to change to a version with malicious content and causes ADM to trigger a new update and the user presses for an update (or starts automatically if automatic update is enabled) and then the virus does its thing job (if you only encrypt a few kbytes at the beginning of each file, it is almost as bad as the whole file has been encrypted in most cases and therefore it can do enormous damage only after 15 minutes of activity) – and if you do reset / restart, the nose wants to do a reinitiation of the disks …

Now both QSNAP and ASUSTOR have been hacked – it’s only a matter of time before Synology and Netgear are also hacked – so keep your offline backups of your NAS up to date.



What can you do if you have been hit?

-you can pay Ransome and hope decryption will work (or use Emisoft)

-you can use PhotoRec or another app that restores freshly deletes files

-you can wait few years until someone creates a key or when computers become fast enough to decrypt AES-128





Regaining Access to the ADM Portal

If you are planning to continue using the existing drives you may regain access to the portal by running these commands below.

First open the Crontab tool to edit what files are being executed on the system.

crontab -e

You will notice a new line entry called cgi_install. Remove the line as found in this image

*/1 * * * * /bin/sh /usr/builtin/etc/cgi_install

Once that is done commit the changes. Then, remove the offending cgi_install file

rm /usr/builtin/etc/cgi_install

After that is done, navigate to the following to replace the bad cgi index file.

cd /usr/webman/portal

chattr -i index.cgi

rm index.cgi

cp index.cgi.bak index.cgi

This will restore the portal to it’s original state. Once inside the portal, turn off EZ-Connect to prevent future access to the NAS. Remember to block all remote access to the NAS from your firewall if possible.


How to prevent this from happening again?

-Use Unifi firewall

-use routers with smart protection tools like DreamMachine

-never open any ports on the router unless it is for VPN connection

-keep NAS operating system on a separate volume / RAID

-back up





DeadBolt technical details [Qnap situation]

Threat actors will install the DeadBolt malware executable as a randomly named file in the /mnt/HDA_ROOT/ folder. Ransomware is initially launched with a config file, which likely contains various data, including an encryption key used to encrypt files.

The initial command to encrypt files is:

[random_file_name] -e [config] /share

The /share folder is where QNAP NAS devices store user folders and files.

When encrypting files, the ransomware will only target files with the following file extensions:

.3dm, .3ds, .3fr, .3g2, .3gp, .3pr, .ab4, .accdb, .accdc, .accde, .accdr, .accdt, .ach, .acr, .act, .adb, .ads, .agdl, .ait, .apj, .arw, .asf, .asm, .asp, .aspx, .asx, .avhd, .avi, .awg, .back, .backup, .backupdb, .bak, .bank, .bay, .bdb, .bgt, .bik, .bin, .bkf, .bkp, .blend, .bpw, .cdf, .cdr, .cdr3, .cdr4, .cdr5, .cdr6, .cdrw, .cdx, .ce1, .ce2, .cer, .cfg, .cfp, .cgm, .cib, .class, .cls, .cmt, .conf, .cpi, .cpp, .cr2, .craw, .crl, .crt, .crw, .csh, .csl, .csr, .csv, .dac, .dat, .db3, .db4, .db_journal, .dbc, .dbf, .dbx, .dc2, .dcr, .dcs, .ddd, .ddoc, .ddrw, .dds, .der, .des, .design, .dev, .dgc, .disk, .djvu, .dng, .doc, .docm, .docx, .dot, .dotx, .drf, .drw, .dtd, .dwg, .dxb, .dxf, .dxg, .edb, .eml, .eps, .erbsql, .erf, .exf, .fdb, .ffd, .fff, .fhd, .fla, .flac, .flv, .fpx, .fxg, .gdb, .git, .gray, .grey, .gry, .hbk, .hdd, .hpp, .ibank, .ibd, .ibz, .idx, .iif, .iiq, .incpas, .indd, .iso, .jar, .java, .jpe, .jpeg, .jpg, .jrs, .kc2, .kdbx, .kdc, .key, .kpdx, .lua, .m4v, .mail, .max, .mdb, .mdbx, .mdc, .mdf, .mef, .mfw, .mkv, .mmw, .moneywell, .mos, .mov, .mp3, .mp4, .mpg, .mrw, .msi, .myd, .ndd, .nef, .nk2, .nop, .nrg, .nrw, .ns2, .ns3, .ns4, .nsd, .nsf, .nsg, .nsh, .nsn, .nwb, .nx2, .nxl, .nyf, .obj, .oda, .odb, .odc, .odf, .odg, .odm, .odp, .ods, .odt, .oil, .orf, .ost, .otg, .oth, .otp, .ots, .ott, .ova, .ovf, .p12, .p7b, .p7c, .p7r, .pages, .pas, .pat, .pcd, .pct, .pdb, .pdd, .pdf, .pef, .pem, .pfx, .php, .pio, .piz, .plc, .pmf, .png, .pot, .potm, .potx, .ppam, .pps, .ppsm, .ppsx, .ppt, .pptm, .pptx, .prf, .ps1, .psafe3, .psd, .pspimage, .pst, .ptx, .pvi, .pvk, .pyc, .qba, .qbb, .qbm, .qbr, .qbw, .qbx, .qby, .r3d, .raf, .rar, .rat, .raw, .rdb, .rtf, .rw2, .rwl, .rwz, .s3db, .sas7bdat, .say, .sd0, .sda, .sdb, .sdf, .sl3, .sldm, .sldx, .spc, .sql, .sqlite, .sqlite3, .sqlitedb, .sr2, .srf, .srt, .srw, .st4, .st5, .st6, .st7, .st8, .stc, .std, .sti, .stw, .stx, .svg, .swf, .sxc, .sxd, .sxg, .sxi, .sxm, .sxw, .tar, .tex, .tga, .thm, .tiff, .tlg, .txt, .vbk, .vbm, .vbox, .vcb, .vdi, .vfd, .vhd, .vhdx, .vmc, .vmdk, .vmem, .vmfx, .vmsd, .vmx, .vmxf, .vob, .vsd, .vsdx, .vsv, .wallet, .wav, .wb2, .wdb, .wmv, .wpd, .wps, .x11, .x3f, .xis, .xla, .xlam, .xlk, .xlm, .xlr, .xls, .xlsb, .xlsm, .xlsx, .xlt, .xltm, .xltx, .xlw, .xvd, .ycbcra, .yuv, .zip

Files are encrypted with AES128 encryption and will have the .deadbolt extension appended to file names.

DeadBolt will also replace the /home/httpd/index.html file with popup asking for a payment to get a key

If you pay, you get a key. The decryption key is located under the OP_RETURN output, as shown below.

When you enter this key into the ransom note screen, the web page will convert it into a SHA256 hash and compare it to the SHA256 hash of the victim’s decryption key and the SHA256 hash of the master decryption key.


If the decryption key matches either SHA256 hash, it will decrypt the files using the following command:

/mnt/HDA_ROOT/[encryptor_name] -d "[decryption_key]" /share



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One thought on “How do Asustor DeadBolt Ransomware works?

  1. User comments:
    “I drive with an ASUSTOR (4-port) and does not seem to have spread from the boot volume to me.
    I run with:
    1 SSD as BOOT
    3x HDD where everyone is NTFS MyArchive (likes to throw disks in the closet for cold storage), and those that were connected had not been encrypted.

    Drove with everything off, firewall was set to whitelist instead of blacklist and it geoblocked everything that was not in the EU
    SSH was turned off.
    The only thing that was running was EZ-Connect.
    Ran latest firmware (ADM), and no automatic update.”